[MGSA-L] KARAOLIS AND BRITISH COLONIALISM IN CYPRUS

DANIEL P. Tompkins pericles at temple.edu
Thu May 22 11:05:42 PDT 2014


Thanks. Great Britain was indeed in a difficult position:  but why were
they there in the first place, and why did they deserve to stay?

Sir Ronald Storrs, who served on Cyprus in the 1930s, is decidedly negative
about the British role there in his memoirs.  He says the civil servants
placed there ( himself a likely exception) were unimaginative
bottom-feeders in the colonial hierarchy; his comments on the  the Ottoman
Debt are priceless:

Disraeli, eager to clinch his bargain, was from his point of view no less
justified in throwing in what must have appeared a trifling and reasonable
makeweight. What was entirely unjustifiable was that this sum, which was
evaluated with the scrupulous exactitude characteristic of faked accounts
of 92799 pounds 11s 3d, should have been made a yearly charge, not upon the
British Exchequer, but upon the revenues of Cyprus.  The basis of
calculation was no less iniquitous, for the Porte had followed their usual
practice of extracting the maximum of taxation and according in return the
minimum of service....


What *policy goals *motivated British retention in the era of
decolonization?  Looking through Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in
Cyprus<http://www.amazon.com/Britain-Revolt-Cyprus-1954-1959-Holland/dp/0198205384/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1400779717&sr=1-2&keywords=robert+holland+cyprus>,
I find only one:  it needed a military base in the region, and was
resigned, from 1950 on, to behaving as "an occupying power."  Holland's
account of British decision-making is enough to make one weep.  Briton
Busch, reviewing Holland, concludes:

One oddity in  the entire story is the rather emotional basis for Britain's
determination to hold on in Cyprus. "Strategy" was always given out as the
cause: oil, food, survival-that sort of thing: "Look at the map," said an
impatient Harding when asked about this. But with Egypt, Palestine, even
Malta gone, only Cyprus was left as a physical representation of Britain's
East Mediterranean history-at bottom, as so often in imperial history, a
subjective, not objective factor. Unfortunately, in the 1950's it was hard
justifying the loss of British lives for such symbolism

The Greek diplomat Rodis Roufos -- later a valued conservative opponent of
the dictatorship -- reported that Lawrence Durrell's work for the British
involved telling leftist visitors that Makarios was a fascist, and
right-wingers that he was a communist.  And as Walton reports (not really
news) Harding was one of the most violent of British viceroys in this era.

Sadly,  violence occurred and too many innocents were killed.    Diplomatic
mistakes were made on all sides -- the JMGS has had valuable articles and
reviews about these.  It is difficult to make judgments about what ought to
have been done, and certainly difficult to place blame.  But it's not hard
to say that Britain's difficult position was one *she had sought*, at the
expense of many all around the globe, and that what happened in Cyprus was
not, really, much different from what happened in other places she tried to
retain.   Or, compared to the value of India or Suez, or Malaya with its
tin and rubber, what *did* make Cyprus "different" was that Britain had,
compared with these places, no reason at all to hang on with her brutal
occupying army.

Best,

Dan Tompkins


On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 11:53 AM, George Gedeon <g.gedeon at sympatico.ca>wrote:

> Thank you for the correction George but I still believe that Great Britain
> was in a difficult position having to deal with Greek and Turkish demands
> on the island, the rising tensions between the Cypriot Left and Right, the
> Middle East conflict, the Cold War plus the Cypriot revolt.
>
> Once more, this whole discussion began when Mr Caratzas suggested the
> Karaolis was killed by the British authorities for his pro-Enosis
> sentiments without mentioning that he was executed for killing a Cypriot
> policeman.
>
> As for Turkey, never underestimate their ability to use their armed forces
> if their national security and interests are threatened.
>
> G
>
>
>
> On 2014-05-22, at 11:25 AM, George Baloglou wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 5:52 PM, George Gedeon <g.gedeon at sympatico.ca>wrote:
>
> It is all speculation George whether Turkey would or not have invaded in
>> the 50s if GB had agreed to Enosis.
>>
>> If I am not mistaken, GB, Turkey and Greece had signed an agreement to
>> guarantee Cyprus' independence and all or any of the three parties had the
>> right to intervene in case either party or anyone else threatened the
>> island's independence.
>>
>
> The Zurich Agreement was signed in 1959 (i.e., 'after the fact').
>
> --
>
> Γιώργος Μπαλόγλου -- Θεσσαλονίκη
>
> http://www.oswego.edu/~baloglou (1988 - 2008)
>
> http://crystallomath.wordpress.com (2009 - )
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> List-Info: https://maillists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/mgsa-l
>
>
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