

# **Party Attitudes Towards the EU in the Member States**

**Parties for Europe, parties against Europe**

**Edited by Nicolò Conti**

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
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## 8 Greece

*Susannah Verney with Sofia Michalaki*

### **1994–2009: after Cold War polarisation and before economic crisis**

This chapter examines the attitudes of Greek political parties towards the EU, as presented in their manifestos for the last four European Parliament elections. The 15-year period framed by the Euro-elections of 1994–2009 constitutes a discrete phase of the Greek European debate. By this point, Greece's relationship to European integration was no longer a source of polarisation, as it had been prior to the country's European Community accession in 1981. At that time, the parties of the right, centre and eurocommunist left had supported membership while the socialists and orthodox communists had adopted a hard eurosceptic line, entailing opposition both to integration as a matter of principle and to Greek participation in the process. In the country's first European Parliament election, held ten months after EC entry, the socialists and communists together won 52 per cent of votes and seats. However, the climate changed rapidly over the following decade. Domestically, Community membership became an accepted part of the environment within which Greek parties had to operate while externally, the Gorbachev period of perestroika in the Soviet Union inaugurated the cataclysmic shifts in the international system which culminated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989.

By the third Greek Euro-election in June 1989, 'it seemed that Greece's EC orientation was finally becoming a matter of national consensus' (Featherstone and Verney 1990 p. 96). The socialists, in power since 1981, after an initial period of ambivalence had accepted EC membership as a *fait accompli* that would be too costly to reverse, while insisting on the continued national right to veto. Subsequently, the socialist government's signature on the Single European Act marked a significant rapprochement with the deepening of integration, including the extension of qualified majority voting. The communist party retained a hard eurosceptic line much longer, but in Spring 1989 joined the former eurocommunists in the Coalition of the Forces of the Left and Progress (*Synaspismos*), whose programme included a recognition of the reality of Greece's EC membership in the context of a Europe undergoing rapid change. As a result, no significant party fought the 1989 Euro-election on a platform of

opposition to membership. However, far from the start of a new era, 1989 was to prove the exception among the seven Greek Euro-elections to date. In the four subsequent Euro-elections – the contests which provide the material for this chapter – European integration was once again a contested issue.

By 1994, following a brief experiment with coalition government in 1989–90, the party system had adopted the form which it essentially retained throughout the period under consideration in this chapter. The basic characteristic of the system was its domination by the two major post-dictatorship parties, New Democracy (ND) and PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement). At the national level, these two parties alternated in single-party governments (ND 1990–93, PASOK 1993–2004, ND 2004–09), while in the four European Parliament elections of 1994–2009, PASOK and ND together never won less than 68.8 per cent of the votes and 72 per cent of seats. Both parties during this period can be classified as Europhile. For ND, its historic role in leading the country into the EC had been a central element of the party's identity since the 1970s. Meanwhile, the socialists had now moved far from the radical positions of the pre-accession period.<sup>1</sup> By the time of the 1994 Euro-election – and even more after the 1996 leadership change, when party founder and former radical eurosceptic, Andreas Papandreou, finally retired – PASOK could be regarded as part of the mainstream West European centre-left.

The new shape of the party system, centred on two Europhile parties of power, stood in marked contrast to the previous period of polarisation, when the two major parties had faced each other from opposite sides on the question of European integration. Instead, in the period 1994–2009, euroscepticism became the exclusive preserve of the minor parties. After the brief interlude of coalition rule in 1989–90, the return to one-party government, confirmed by the national parliamentary elections of 1993 and 1996, meant the small parties found themselves in a position of permanent opposition. Thus, with the reconsolidation of the party system around two pro-integrationist forces, the Greek European debate had a quite different dynamic during this period.

First, as indicated above, political competition around Europe no longer had a strong left–right dimension but instead resembled the inverted U-curve noted by Hooghe *et al.* (2004), with a pro-integrationist centre-left and centre-right flanked by eurosceptic parties at the two ends of the political spectrum. Second, the content of the debate had changed. During the previous period of polarisation, underlying the debate had been the key existential question: 'to be or not to be in the European Community?' (Verney 1990). In contrast, from the early 1990s, with the reconsolidation of the party system around two pro-integrationist parties of power with such a dominant hold over the party system, it was clear that in reality – despite the communists' insistence to the contrary – Greece's EU membership was a fact of life. At the same time, with the advent of the post-Cold War era, European integration had entered a period of revolutionary change, with deepening and enlargement proceeding at an unprecedented scale and speed. The underlying question during this period, therefore, was no longer 'whether Europe' but 'what kind of Europe' did the Greek political forces want.

If the 1994 Euro-election came at the beginning of a new period, 2009 can be regarded as closing this particular chapter. After the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, just a few months after this last Euro-election, the existential question of Greek participation in integration came back on to the political agenda. The Greek party system began a period of dramatic change, triggered by Greece's national bankruptcy and the ensuing policy of radical austerity linked to bailouts from the European Union and International Monetary Fund (IMF). These experiences resulted in the meltdown of the party system in the May 2012 parliamentary election and its partial reconstitution – on a different basis – in the repeat poll which took place six weeks later. At the time of writing, it is not yet apparent how the developments since the signature of Greece's first Memorandum of Understanding with the EU and IMF in June 2010 will play out in the next European Parliament election, scheduled for May 2014. What already seems clear, however, is that the forthcoming contest will be part of a new period, in which the dynamics of the Greek European debate and of the parties conducting it will be rather different from 1994–2009. The aim of this chapter is to investigate, through analysis of Euro-election manifestos, the question of 'what kind of Europe' the Greek political parties envisaged during the very distinct period from the Treaty of Maastricht to the outbreak of the eurozone crisis.

## Case selection

European Parliament elections have been famously described as 'second order national elections' (Reif and Schmidt 1980). The experience to date has been one of contests in which national parties fight each other within the national arena, often over national issues and with the outcome determined by the shifting national balance of power rather than by developments at the European level. This is far removed from the federalist dream of 'truly' European elections, in which voters would choose between pan-European lists putting forward competing views of the European Union. Nevertheless, it means that Euro-elections offer a good opportunity to examine national party positions. Even though the issue of European integration is not usually the central axis of party contestation, it is likely to have higher salience in European than in national or sub-national polls. For this reason, Euro-elections have been chosen as the field of study here.

Election manifestos offer the most official expression of the views of the party in central office and a 'shorthand' way of comparing party positions through documents of similar type and scope. Although the study of manifestos has now become established in comparative politics research, mainly due to the work of the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project (MRG/CMP), so far there has been limited manifesto research on the Greek case. Examples to date include Konstantinidis (2004), who analysed the manifestos of three parties (PASOK, ND and the communist KKE) in the ten national elections of 1974–2000, and Gemenis and Dinas (2010) who focused on the 2004 Euro-election. The present research examines manifestos from the four Euro-elections of 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009.

The electoral system used for the Greek Euro-elections – simple proportional representation with the whole country treated as a single constituency – has encouraged the participation of multiple parties: 40 in 1994, 41 in 1999, 23 in 2004 and 27 in 2009 (Teperoglu 2008 pp. 511–512, 290, 533 and Greek Ministry of Interior electoral data 2009). This is a very high number, even when compared with national parliamentary elections in Greece.<sup>2</sup> As a matter of necessity, therefore, the case selection is limited to significant parties, defined as those which won at least one EP seat in the election studied. This means five parties in each of the Euro-elections of 1994, 1999 and 2004 and six in 2009. For the 1999 contest, it was decided to add POLAN (Political Spring), which held a seat in the previous European Parliament and was a serious contender in this election too, winning 2.3 per cent of the vote. Its positions were therefore part of the mainstream pre-electoral debate. Moreover, this party currently has an additional interest, given that it was founded and led by Andonis Samaras, since 2009 the leader of New Democracy and, from June 2012, Prime Minister of Greece. Our research therefore covers eight different political parties and a total set of 22 cases (treating each party in each election as a separate case).

A significant challenge of manifesto research in Greece concerns the collection of the appropriate material. In only ten of our 22 cases were actual manifestos available. Just two parties, the left-wing KKE and SYN (Coalition of the Left and Progress, renamed the Coalition of Left Movements and Ecology in 2003), consistently published extensive 'Declarations' voted by their party Central Committee before each election. Similar documents were also produced by ND in 2004 and the Ecogreens in 2009. The absence of manifestos in the other 12 cases is itself an interesting finding, attributable to the Euro-elections' perceived lack of salience, with some parties apparently considering it was not worth producing lengthy position statements for these second order elections.

In any case, it raises the question of what alternative material to use. The practice of MRG/CMP, to substitute manifestos with pre-election speeches by party leaders, has been trenchantly criticised by Gemenis (2012), who shows with examples from Greece how the different length, thematic range and especially language register of these proxy documents distorts results. In several of our cases, internal party documents were available, providing notes on party positions for party cadres who would be making election speeches. We rejected these on similar grounds to Gemenis' arguments about the speeches but, above all, because they were not official party publications designed for the general public. Given that a political party manifesto is a written public declaration through which a party communicates directly with the electorate, the obvious substitute would appear to be the official election literature prepared specially for the election and distributed during the campaign.<sup>3</sup> The documents we used were drawn partly from the MRG/CMP collection and partly from party websites, but mainly from personal archives<sup>4</sup> of material collected at the time of the various elections.<sup>5</sup> Before moving on to examine the material, let us first present the party actors.



## The players

As already mentioned, the Greek party system during this period was dominated by the two pro-integrationist parties of government. The centre-left PASOK and centre-right ND each won a minimum of around one-third of the vote and eight EP seats in all four Euro-elections. In terms of European alliances, ND had joined the European People's Party (EPP) some months after accession in 1981. PASOK participated in the EP Socialist Group from the moment of accession but initially attempted to maintain some ideological distance from West European social democracy by remaining outside the Socialist International (SI). An important signal of PASOK's ideological rapprochement with its EC partner parties came with its SI entry in 1989 while in the early 1990s it became one of the founding participants in the Party of European Socialists. Thus, during the period under consideration, the two leading Greek players were fully incorporated into the two dominant Euro-parties and increasingly aligned with the latter's policies. In the period of rapid deepening and enlargement of integration between the Maastricht Treaty and the onset of the eurozone crisis, both parties consistently voted in favour of European Treaty amendments and the accession of new members and both were keen supporters of eurozone entry.

Also permanent elements of the party system during this period were the two parties of the left, which won seats in all four Euro-elections. KKE (the Communist Party of Greece) won two or three seats in each Euro-election. The country's longest-lived political party, dating back to 1918, the KKE has consistently advocated a national road to socialism and maintained a hard Eurosceptic stance, apart from the brief period in the late 1980s mentioned above.<sup>6</sup> After its brief experience of government participation in 1989–90, the KKE's vote against the ratification of the Treaty of European Union in July 1992 signalled the Greek CP's return to its traditional role as an anti-system protest party. Subsequently, it maintained a hard eurosceptic position, opposing both enlargement and deepening of the European Union, voting against the ratification of all accession agreements and European Treaty amendments, and openly advocating a national 'rupture' with the EU. In the European Parliament, the KKE initially joined the old communist group. From 1994, it sat with the newly founded European United Left/Nordic Green Left group (GUE/NGL) but did not join the Party of the European Left in the 2000s.

SYN won two seats in the two Euro-elections of the 1990s, reduced to one in the two twenty-first century contests.<sup>7</sup> SYN was essentially the continuation of the left-wing alliance of the late 1980s without the KKE. Following the latter's withdrawal in 1991, SYN was reconstituted the following year as a unified party. Initially situated in the tradition of the pro-integrationist 'renewal left' born from the historic split of the KKE in 1968, SYN's enthusiastic pro-European stance gradually mutated as the party became increasingly disillusioned with the neo-liberal direction taken by the integration process. As a result, SYN was the Greek party whose EU stance showed the most change over this period. By the late 2000s, the party had clearly redefined itself as part of the new European

'radical left'. While still favouring European integration in principle, it became increasingly critical in practice, a stance fitting the picture of soft euroscepticism as defined by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008). The culmination of the party's European shift was the 2009 Euro-election which SYN contested as the leading component of SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left), in alliance with a range of leftist grupuscules, all more eurosceptic than the party itself. The shift in party policy was reflected at the 'history-making moments' of European Treaty ratification in the national parliament. SYN voted in favour of the Treaty of European Union, abstained on Amsterdam and Nice, and voted against the European Constitution and the Treaty of Lisbon. However, SYN consistently voted in favour of EU enlargement while a rejection of the national road to socialism espoused by the KKE remained at the heart of party strategy. In the EP, SYN was a founder member of the GUE/NGL group and played a leading role in the foundation of the Party of the European Left in 2004.

Besides these two permanent components of the party system, four more ephemeral forces also won EP representation during this period. All were minor parties, winning one or at most two EP seats, and in three cases appearing in the EP as one-term wonders. Two of these parties were situated on the left and two on the right. In the case of the latter, their positions marked a break with the uncritical pro-Europeanism which had characterised the Greek right (mainstream and far right) throughout the Cold War.

POLAN (Political Spring), with 8.7 per cent of the vote, won two EP seats in 1994. Founded the previous year as an ND breakaway, POLAN was a nationalist party originally built around the single issue of the Greek refusal to recognise its neighbouring state under a name including the word 'Macedonia'. This nationalist strategy was combined with centrist economic policies.<sup>8</sup> In the 1993 national election, POLAN won 4.9 per cent of the national vote, making it the third largest political force, just ahead of the traditional third party, the KKE. On this initial electoral appearance, POLAN positioned itself firmly in the europhile camp, reflecting both the traditional policy of ND, the party from which it had splintered, and the role of party leader, Andonis Samaras, as the ND Foreign Minister during the Maastricht Treaty negotiation. At that time, POLAN called for Greece to play a leadership role in the creation of a united Europe. Subsequently the balance between nationalism and Europeanism in the party's programmatic statements seems to have shifted in favour of the former. This may be because the party's 1993 success was based on an appeal to a nationalist constituency which cut across the left-right axis. The result was often an uneasy balancing act between appealing to nationalist and Europeanist constituencies. A characteristic example was POLAN's 1999 Euro-election manifesto, in which conflicting demands for the preservation of national sovereignty and for a federal Europe appear in consecutive sentences, just above a call for EU enlargement to embrace Russia. The party's policy did not bring electoral success: POLAN disappeared from the national parliament in 1996 and from the EP in 1999. Following this failure, POLAN did not contest the 2000 national election and in 2004, Samaras rejoined ND, becoming party leader five years later.

The other party on the right was LAOS (Greek Popular Orthodox Rally), which won one EP seat in 2004 and two in 2009, also entering the national parliament in 2007. Founded in 2000 by a former ND MP, LAOS was a rather different party from POLAN, in the new mould of the West European radical right.<sup>9</sup> Its chief focus was the defence of the national identity – an identity in which the Greek Orthodox religion was deemed a fundamental element – against the threats of globalisation and, particularly, immigration. Although LAOS did not advocate Greek withdrawal from the EU, its fundamental position in defence of the nation-state meant its preference was for a ‘Europe of Nations’ at odds with the current reality of European integration. Not surprisingly, therefore, when the Treaty of Lisbon came up for ratification during its first national parliamentary term, the party voted against it. It had previously declared its opposition to the Draft Treaty establishing a European Constitution. LAOS also opposed Greece’s adoption of the euro, both before and after the event, and during the 2007 national election campaign called for a referendum on whether Greece should stay in the eurozone. In the EP, LAOS participated in two Eurosceptic groups: the Independence/Democracy Group (2004–09) and Europe of Freedom and Democracy (2009–).

On the left, DIKKI (Democratic Social Movement) won two EP seats in 1999. DIKKI was a socialist splinter group, founded in 1995 by nostalgics for the old radical PASOK at a time when the latter, like many of its West European counterparts, was clearly shifting towards centrist ‘Third Way’ positions. Unlike the early PASOK, the party did not oppose EU membership itself, but declared its obdurate opposition to the neoliberal turn of European integration associated with the Maastricht Treaty. The central focus of DIKKI’s European policy was its opposition to Economic and Monetary Union and the national economic austerity associated with it. In an echo of PASOK’s 1970s slogan, ‘EC and NATO the same syndicate’, DIKKI’s 1999 Euro-election material included a cartoon of the Greek prime minister caught between NATO, represented as a cigar-chomping US general, and EMU, depicted as a hooded hangman. During its single national parliamentary term, the party voted against the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam. In the EP, the party joined GUE/NGL, alongside KKE and SYN. After one term in each, DIKKI failed to be re-elected to the national parliament in 2000 and to the EP in 2004.

Finally, the Ecogreens won one EP seat in 2009. Founded in 2002 as the Greek component of the then European Federation of Green Parties, the party was from the start strongly influenced by the latter and clearly focused on Europe. The Ecogreens are ‘decidedly Europeanist, in favour of an enlarged and federal EU with a Common Foreign and Security policy, a social and environmental Constitutional Treaty, and an EU with increased powers’ (Gemenis 2009). In 2004 the Ecogreens became founder members of the European Green Party, with whom they sit in the European Parliament. The party is clearly positioned on the left, its policy positions including the abolition of NATO.

The above parties’ position statements for the Euro-elections were analysed using the coding scheme of the INTUNE project as discussed in the

introduction to this volume. Our total sample of 22 cases was broken down into a number of sub-groups in order to test some theoretical predictions concerning the party characteristics influencing stands on European integration. The first prediction distinguishes between government incumbents and opposition parties, suggesting the former will be more integration-supportive than the latter (e.g. Sitter 2001). In the Greek case, we have four incumbents (PASOK 1994 and 1999 and ND 2004 and 2009) and 18 parties that were in opposition at the time of the elections (all the other cases). The second theory posits a core-periphery distinction, proposing that the parties on the margins of the political spectrum will be more eurosceptic than those at its central core (e.g. Szczerbiak and Taggart 2000). There are eight mainstream cases (four manifestos from each of the two parties of government, PASOK and ND) compared to 14 'marginals' (covering six parties: KKE, SYN/SYRIZA, POLAN, DIKKI, LAOS and the Ecogreens).

Our third hypothesis concerns left-right ideology. In its early decades, European integration was predominantly supported by parties of the right and centre and often opposed by the left. This had changed in the period under examination, with the emergence of social democracy as a leading integration supporter and of a new eurosceptic current on the radical right (Hooghe *et al.* 2004). However, in the Greek case, the recent nature of PASOK's conversion and the late emergence of the radical right (after 2000) make it more likely that support for integration will come predominantly from the right rather than the left. This hypothesis will be tested by comparing the 14 cases from the left of the political spectrum (encompassing five parties: PASOK, KKE, SYN/SYRIZA, DIKKI and the Ecogreens) with the eight cases from the three parties of the right (ND, POLAN and LAOS). Having introduced the players, let us now turn to the play.

### **The salience of European integration in electoral competition**

The first question addressed in our research concerns the overall salience of European integration in our Greek parties' election material. To state the obvious, when conducting election campaigns, parties will focus on issues which they expect will win them votes, while avoiding issues which might divide their voters or reduce their appeal. Of course, that a particular theme is not mentioned in an election manifesto does not necessarily mean it is absent from the party's campaign. It may, for instance, appear in speeches by party candidates or emerge as an issue in TV debates. However, its presence or absence in the written election material prepared by party central office is significant, as the latter provides an official encapsulation of the public picture which the party aims to present of itself and its programme.

Throughout 1994–2009, there was never a point – and certainly never a Euro-election – when the deepening of European integration was not under discussion. However, this by no means guaranteed its salience at the national level. This point was investigated using two questions concerning the preferred level of

decision-making and the policy scope of EU governance, capturing the two fundamental dimensions of the deepening debate. Examining our 22 cases, we recorded a positive result for salience if the manifesto included a minimum of one reference to at least one of these indicators. Despite the well-known tendency for Euro-elections to play out as second order national elections, the majority of our cases (17 out of 22) did include references to these themes. Nevertheless, this left five cases where party Euro-election manifestos did not include a single reference to either of the key axes of the deepening debate. In each of these cases, this 'European absence' was hardly accidental, but a conscious choice of electoral strategy, as will be discussed below:

As shown in Figure 8.1, the deepening of integration was more salient for marginal (85.7 per cent) than for mainstream (62.5 per cent), for left-wing (85.7 per cent) than for right-wing (62.5 per cent) and particularly for opposition (83.3 per cent) as opposed to governing parties (50 per cent). It was non-salient in at least one Euro-election for all three parties on the right (ND, POLAN and LAOS) but on the left, only for PASOK. Particularly notable was the 100 per cent salience for the four marginal parties of the left (KKE, SYN, DIKKI and Ecogreens), which always addressed the deepening of integration at every election. It seems that for Greek left-wing protest parties, Europe, whether for or against, was a key ideological issue for signalling their differences both from the mainstream parties and from each other. The classic example concerns the permanent contest for predominance on the radical left between KKE and SYN, in




Figure 8.1 The salience of Europe in Greek electoral competition: percentage of Greek Euro-election manifestos referring to the deepening of integration, 1994–2009.

which diametrically opposed positions on integration served as a flagship of competing political worldviews. In contrast, the right-wing protest parties, with only 50 per cent salience of Europe, clearly preferred to compete on other issues. Meanwhile, the comparatively low salience of EU deepening for the pro-integrationist incumbent parties (50 per cent) requires further investigation, especially when compared to the higher salience (75 per cent) for the same parties when in opposition.

In fact, both cases of a governing party which did not mention its preferences regarding the deepening of integration concerned PASOK. In 1994, this partly reflected the generally low significance the party attributed to a contest sandwiched between its sweeping national election victory of October 1993 and the forthcoming local government elections of October 1994. Both the latter polls, concerning the allocation of domestic power, were of considerably greater strategic significance than the share-out of seats in the European Parliament. A second consequence of this string of elections was to leave the party low on resources. Partly for practical reasons, therefore, the governing socialists produced no election material of their own, circulating only a Greek translation of the Party of European Socialists manifesto (see Verney and Featherstone 1996). As a result, the party's programmatic statement for the Euro-elections consisted of a two-page Greek preface to the PES manifesto, signed by party leader, Andreas Papandreou.

However, 1994 was not an aberration. Limitation of PASOK's official manifesto statements on the issue of European integration was rather characteristic. In the 1981 dual national and European election, the party's 112-page manifesto included just one page on 'The accession to the European Communities', tucked away in a chapter on economic policy. In the 1984 Euro-election, the 97-page manifesto did not mention the EC at all, although admittedly it was supplemented by an eight-page election leaflet on the party's 'Untiring Struggle' in the EC. Meanwhile, in the dual national and European election of 1989, the 42-page manifesto included just over half a page on 'Europe'. In all these cases, PASOK's short statements of European policy were low in substantive content. In similar vein, PASOK in 1994 seems to have made a conscious choice to convey its pro-Europeanism through public identification with the PES programme, rather than making any assessment of the significance of EU membership for Greece or laying out programmatic positions of its own on the future of European integration.

That PASOK did not see European policy as favourable electoral terrain was probably due to the traditional 'ownership' of the European issue by ND, which never lost an opportunity of reminding the electorate of its own role in achieving Greek accession. The socialists' own U-turn in this area was another weak point. PASOK had no reason to remind either its pro-European voters of the party's former euroscepticism or those faithful to its original worldview of the party's striking ideological shift. Instead, the 1994 election document took the easier road of defining the party's European policy as 'aiming at the safeguarding of our national interests'. This was consistent with the party line adopted in the

early 1980s, when PASOK's initial hard euroscepticism had been replaced by a new discourse about defending national interests from within the EC. In 1994, the 'national interests' reference also served as a reminder of the government's tough stance in imposing a trade embargo on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia four months earlier. The resulting referral of Greece to the European Court of Justice was followed by a rise in the government's popularity and a sharp drop in pro-EU public opinion. In this climate, dwelling on the future of European integration seemed a less successful strategy than reminding the voters of PASOK's willingness to stand up to its EU partners.

However, the low salience of Europe in PASOK's Euro-election manifestos was not confined to the period when the party was led by Andreas Papandreou. In 1996 the election of his successor was widely hailed as inaugurating a new era in Greek-EU relations. Kostas Simitis immediately made eurozone entry the central plank of his government programme. Under his leadership, 'probably for the first time since its 1981 accession, official Greece was finally in full mental and political accord with the European Union, seeing eye-to-eye with its integrationist core' (Pagoulatos and Yataganas 2010 p. 198). Yet in 1999, the party's main Euro-election pamphlet, on the economy, did not mention the words 'Europe', 'European integration' or 'EU'. Its second pamphlet, on regional stability, referred only to integration into the European architecture as part of the solution to the Balkan problem. Its third pamphlet, aimed at women voters, stated that Greece's 'geo-economic position' was not unilaterally focused on the EU but also embraced the Balkans and the Mediterranean.<sup>10</sup> Thus, although PASOK by this time was clearly positioned in the pro-integrationist camp, it appears that in the 1990s the promotion of its European policy was not considered essential to selling the brand. This changed in the 2004 Euro-election, under the new leadership of Georgios Papandreou. By this time, Greece's eurozone entry under a PASOK government in 2002 gave the socialists strong European credentials of their own, allowing them to compete with ND in this area.

Equally striking was the low visibility of European issues in ND's 1999 campaign, its first under the leadership of Kostas Karamanlis, nephew and namesake of the party's founder. Throughout the two previous decades, ND's image as a pro-European party had been considered an essential part of its appeal. The party had always made considerable electoral use of the elder Karamanlis' role as the architect of Greece's EC entry. Yet in ND's first election campaign under the leadership of the younger Karamanlis, its 1999 'New Start' did not express preferences on the deepening of integration. Instead, it centred on 'Ten Priorities', with the only EU-related reference being the instrumental 'increasing absorption of Community funds'. While asking 'What Greece do we want in EMU?', ND did not express any vision of what kind of Europe Greece should prefer.

The 1999 Euro-election, occurring past the midpoint of a second PASOK government term, was seen by both major parties as a dress rehearsal for the forthcoming national contest. In their election material, both parties focused

on each other, painting a bleak picture of their opponent's record in office. That neither party saw European issues as a useful tool may have been partly because by 1999, PASOK and ND were pursuing rather similar European policies. In particular, they shared a central commitment to EMU entry, entailing the implementation of unpopular economic austerity to meet the criteria. Six months before the election, the third stage of EMU had started – without Greece, the only EU member-state which had wanted but failed to join. Thus, at this point, the EMU entry drive seemed a case of all pain and no gain. Moreover, this Euro-election, like its predecessor, played out against the backdrop of the violent breakup of Yugoslavia. The NATO bombing of Kosovo, which ended just three days before the election, was extremely unpopular in Greece where 'it reignited old positions of anti-Westernism' (Kazamias and Featherstone 2001 p. 91), in turn conducive to euroscepticism. Therefore, for both PASOK and ND, in the 1999 Euro-election European integration did not seem a vote winner.

Our two other cases concern marginal parties of the right. In 1994, POLAN's central mobilising strategy – the claim to be the only political force capable of defending Greek national interests – had suffered a dynamic challenge from the PASOK trade embargo against FYROM. In this context, the party sharpened its nationalist discourse to the point of adopting a confrontational stance towards the EU. Directly competing with PASOK in terms of national interest discourse, POLAN adopted the election slogan 'Strong Greeks–Equal Europeans', while its campaign keynote was the statement that 'We are pro-European but at the same time we give battle to safeguard our country's rights'. POLAN's chief line of attack against PASOK and ND was to claim their membership of European parties had compromised their independence and resulted in them accepting policies damaging to Greece, notably on employment and the Macedonian question. This claim was enlivened with inflammatory rhetoric about a Greece 'continually kowtowing in apology' to its European partners. (POLAN itself was non-aligned within the EP.) Beyond this, the manifesto did not engage with European integration, but sent a signal to pro-European voters through a symbolic European cover, juxtaposing the Greek and EU flags.

Finally, for LAOS, spelling out its position on Europe<sup>2</sup> was never central to this party's competition strategy. LAOS preferred to focus on an anti-immigrant discourse with growing appeal in a decade when undocumented immigration was becoming an increasingly explosive issue. In 2009 the party, already established in the national parliament and now fighting its second Euro-election, already had its sights set on government participation. Its aim was to present itself as an effective and responsible defender of national interests. Its 24-page election pamphlet focused exclusively on comparing the party's record in a series of European Parliament votes on Macedonia, Turkey and Cyprus with those of the other Greek parties, whose stance was attributed to 'obligations of enslavement' to their pro-integrationist EP groups.

The 'deepening deficit' in each of these four cases influenced the dynamics of the thematic debate on Europe, to which we will now turn.



## The thematic content of European integration in electoral competition

### *Identity*

It has been suggested that the Treaty of European Union, with its deep penetration of national sovereignty and the innovation of European citizenship, significantly increased the salience of identity as an issue in the integration debate. As noted by Liesbet Hooghe (2007 p. 7), 'In the early decades of European integration, Euroscepticism was rooted in opposition to market integration. Since the Maastricht Treaty, it has taken on an additional dimension: defence of the national community.' The rise of national identity politics is not only linked to the deepening of integration, but also reflects the emergence of globalisation and its consequences as a predominant political issue during the same period. One result has been the rise of right-wing populist parties, for whom 'the basis of their success lies in their appeal to identity and their exploitation of anxieties about losing one's identity in a denationalising world' (Kriesi 2009 p. 224). Meanwhile, the difficult process of Treaty ratification, signalling an apparent end to the 'passive consensus' under which the majority of the population had allegedly accorded European integration their tacit toleration, was followed by considerable debate about the construction of a European demos.

In Greece, identity issues had constituted a key axis of disagreement in the pre-accession debate on European integration. In a Europe divided by the Cold War, the question of where Greece belonged had constituted a basic dividing line. The political forces had vehemently contested the nature of both 'Europe' and Greece as well as the compatibility of EC membership with national identity. Proponents of accession, often stressing the Greek roots of European civilization, had presented 'Europe' as Greece's natural habitat and participation in European integration as something like a 'return to the roots'. In contrast, their opponents had argued the EC was a creation of monopoly capitalism which threatened national cultural identity and had championed a view of the country as belonging simultaneously to different geographical regions, of which Western Europe was only one (Verney 1994). Meanwhile, during the post-Cold War era, Greece was rapidly developing a new kind of identity crisis, centred on the survival of the Greek nation under the dual challenges of globalisation and mass immigration. This was to result in heated national debates on issues such as identity cards ceasing to signify religious affiliation or non-nationals carrying the flag in school parades (Verney 2002).

Despite this European and national context, identity as an explicit theme was of rather low salience in our Greek parties' post-Maastricht Euro-election material, mentioned in only half our cases (11 out of 22). As shown in Figure 8.2, identity was of lower than average salience for mainstream parties (mentioned in three of eight cases) and particularly for government incumbents (with only one reference out of four cases). This is partly attributable to the 'absence of Europe' in three of our mainstream manifestos (PASOK 1994 and 1999, ND

1999) mentioned above. Contrary to what might be expected, identity was of equal salience (50 per cent) to left and right. Not only the mainstream ND but also the new right-wing parties, POLAN and LAOS, each mentioned identity in only half their manifestos. The radical right LAOS, for whom identity was normally a key mobilising issue, was silent on this issue in its 2009 election leaflet as on European integration in general. On the left, six out of the seven cases to reference identity concerned KKE and SYN (three cases each), compared to one case for PASOK.

For all the Greek parties, reference to identity in their election material appears almost random and incidental rather than a central element of their European strategies. Moreover, identity was not the object of an interparty dialogue in which parties answered each other's arguments in their manifestos. By 1994, 15 years after accession and in a Europe gradually reuniting after the end of the Cold War, the question of 'where Greece belonged' appeared to have been resolved. Only one Euro-election manifesto (ND 1994) mentioned this theme.

Meanwhile, no new central theme had emerged to replace this old question and provide a common core to the identity debate. Instead, the identity references were rather disparate and all the parties seemed to be talking about different things. Five cases (four parties) talked about elements making up the national identity. This included all three right-wing parties, which mentioned national identity in one manifesto each. LAOS (2004) referred to the role of the Orthodox Church, POLAN (1999) to religion, language, traditions, morals and the importance of the family, and ND (1994) to the ecumenical nature of Hellenism




Figure 8.2 The salience of identity in Greek Euro-election manifestos, 1994–2009.

which had allowed it to become the basis for contemporary global civilisation. On the left, the KKE (2004 and 2009) described cultural tradition, popular culture and language as 'part of the History and consciousness of the people' and a tool of resistance to corrosive imperialist ideology. The other four left-wing parties did not refer to national identity.

In contrast, European identity was mentioned by only one right-wing compared to three left-wing parties. Five cases (three parties) referred to elements making up the current European identity. In two cases (ND 1994, SYN 1999), these concerned the role of Greek civilisation in European culture. The most significant European identity theme, however, was the European social model, mentioned in three cases. For SYN (1994 and 1999), the rights won through the long history of European political and labour struggle were elements of the European identity which required defence against neoliberal attack. Meanwhile, PASOK (2004) referred to 'the achievements of the social state' as part of Europe's 'major comparative advantage', along with its 'intellectual capital, knowledge, education, research, civilisation ... and the quality of its political and legal culture'. Two cases mentioned a vision for the future European identity. For ND (2004), the future Europe should be based on 'justice, freedom, democracy, the rule of law, solidarity and Christian humanism' while SYN (1994) preferred a multicultural, anti-racist model. Only one manifesto talked about the current European identity-building process. This was the KKE (1994), which denounced the EU goal as 'the undermining of national policies and traditions' in order to shape a 'quiet', subservient 'European' consciousness and homogeneous 'European citizens'.

### *Representation*

The democratic deficit, an issue from the early years of integration, became particularly visible in the post-Maastricht era. The continuing transfer of ever more significant competences to the European level without a corresponding democratisation of EU institutions meant decision-making was increasingly removed from citizens' control. The series of public rejections of European Treaties, from the Danish 'no' to Maastricht to the Irish rebuff of Lisbon, suggested increasing popular disaffection with this model, undermining the legitimacy of integration and making the democratic deficit into a high profile issue. From a positive viewpoint, this period also saw a continual expansion of the powers of the European Parliament and therefore of democratic control, beginning with the introduction of the co-decision procedure in the Maastricht Treaty. The current democratic functioning of the EU was of higher salience than identity in our Greek manifestos, appearing in 77.3 per cent of cases (17 out of 22). There seemed to be little difference in salience between incumbents (75 per cent) and the opposition (77.8 per cent) or between mainstream (75 per cent) and marginal parties (78.6 per cent). However, ideology played a significant role, with this issue mentioned by 92.9 per cent of left-wing cases compared to only 50 per cent on the right.




Figure 8.3 Attitudes towards the current functioning of EU democracy in Greek Euro-election manifestos, 1994–2009.

The evaluation of EU democracy by our Greek parties was overwhelmingly negative (13 cases, or 59 per cent of the total). Apart from LAOS, which did not mention this issue at all, the other seven parties, whether eurosceptic or pro-integrationist, offered a purely negative assessment on at least one occasion. Opposition parties were critical more often (61.1 per cent) than government incumbents (50 per cent) and marginal (71.4 per cent) more often than mainstream parties (37.5 per cent), while there was a particularly significant difference between left (78.6 per cent) and right (25 per cent). Of the parties which mentioned this issue on more than one occasion, however, only the KKE was systematically negative every time while PASOK and SYN each also made one mixed assessment and ND one mixed and one positive. The latter, focused on the role of the European Parliament, was the sole positive case in our sample. There was also quite a difference in tone between the communist party's denunciations of an unredeemed anti-democratic integration, designed to serve the interests of the ruling class and the multinationals, and the criticism voiced by PASOK, SYN and the Ecogreens, often linked to references to their joint proposals with other progressive forces for the democratisation of the EU.

The process of institutional deepening, including the repeated extension of the use of qualified majority voting and the growing strength of the European Parliament, meant the mode of cooperation among nation-states at the European level was under continual renegotiation during this period. For our Greek parties,




Figure 8.4 Preferences on EU decision-making as expressed in Greek Euro-election manifestos, 1994–2009.

the nature of EU-level decision-making was an issue of equal salience (again mentioned in 77.3 per cent of cases) with the functioning of democracy. All parties expressed a preference on this topic on at least one occasion and all were consistent: none changed preferences between elections and the only issue was whether they would mention the issue or not. The majority preference, supported by five parties and expressed in 50 per cent of total cases, was for supranationalism. Rather surprisingly, there was no difference in support for supranationalism between government and opposition or between left and right (all at 50 per cent). The only differentiation was between mainstream (62.5 per cent) and marginal parties (42.9 per cent).

As might be expected, the hard eurosceptic communist party was a fervent advocate of national decision-making, while the left-wing DIKKI and the radical right LAOS both indicated an intergovernmental preference. The other five parties – PASOK, ND, POLAN, SYN and the Ecogreens – not only supported supranationalism but also all explicitly declared their support for a federal EU on at least one occasion (POLAN in the rather *sui generis* fashion mentioned above). Indeed, as early as 1994, two Greek parties, ND and SYN, were already calling for a European Constitution. This reflected the emergence of federalism as a buzzword in the Greek European debate in the early 1990s, following the Greek government's enlistment in the pro-federal camp during the Maastricht negotiation. Greek support for federalism was based on a belief that it would

offer smaller states greater decision-making influence than intergovernmentalism, while also serving two important national interests: a common security policy entailing mutual territorial defence and a redistributive budget promoting economic and social cohesion.

Of all our cases, SYN's manifestos from 1994 and 1999 contain the most detail on the future institutional shape of the EU, calling *inter alia* for the election of European Commissioners by the European and national parliaments, the direct election of the Commission President, transparency in all EU decision-making procedures, greater involvement by national parliaments and NGOs, the strengthening of the Committee of the Regions, and especially for political control of monetary policy. This contrasted with PASOK's relative silence on European issues in both these elections. By 2009, however, there had been a clear qualitative shift. While the SYRIZA manifesto referred only to a decisive role for the European Parliament, PASOK mentioned the European Citizens' Initiative, an upgraded role for the European and national parliaments, and the direct election of the Commission President. Meanwhile, the Ecogreens called for a clear separation of powers, greater transparency and new ways of involving national parliaments, citizens and NGOs in EU decision-making. In 2009, SYRIZA had clearly downgraded the pro-European dimension in its election strategy while both PASOK and the Ecogreens were now competing strongly on the pro-European left.

### *Scope of governance*

The Maastricht Treaty intensified the debate on the limits of integration by inaugurating a major expansion of EU competences into policy fields central to national sovereignty, such as external and internal security. Meanwhile, the Treaty's definition of subsidiarity and institutionalisation of an EU decision-making role for sub-national government fuelled discussion on the appropriate level of decision-making competence. To investigate this theme, Greek preferences on this topic were examined in five high-profile policy areas: foreign and defence, justice and crime, immigration, social (including employment) and environmental policies. Scope of governance, mentioned in 14 cases (63.6 per cent), attracted more attention than identity but less than representation. Parties often seemed more interested in talking about the content of policies than indicating at which level they should be decided. For example, both KKE and SYN were very critical of the Schengen Treaty but neither explicitly addressed the question of decision-making in the field of free movement. Overall, scope of governance was more salient for the opposition (66.7 per cent) than for government parties (50 per cent) and particularly for the left (71.4 per cent) than the right (50 per cent), while there was no difference between mainstream (62.5 per cent) and marginal cases (64.3 per cent).

In terms of policy areas, foreign and defence was the most significant, mentioned by seven parties in 13 cases (59 per cent). The level of interest in this subject was partly due to the rapid and major developments in this field, from

the launching of the Common Foreign and Security Policy to the inauguration of the European Security and Defence Policy in just a few years. Meanwhile, with the end of the Cold War and the transformation of Greece's Balkan neighbourhood into a warzone, EU membership was seen by successive Greek governments as a vital source of security. Indeed, in the Maastricht negotiation, the Greek government prioritised the Common Foreign and Security Policy over all other issues (see Ioakimidis 1993 ch. 7). Contrary to what might be expected, foreign and defence policy was more salient for opposition (61.1 per cent) than for government (50 per cent), for marginal (64.3 per cent) than for mainstream (50 per cent) and, overwhelmingly, for the left (71.4 per cent) rather than the right (37.5 per cent). This can be partly attributed to the KKE's consistent emphasis on this area as a key theme of its opposition to integration. While the communists clearly opposed EU policy competences in any area, this was the only one in which EU scope of governance was singled out for explicit mention.

Foreign and defence policy was followed in terms of salience by social (five parties, ten cases), environmental (five parties, seven cases), immigration (three parties, five cases) and justice and crime policies (one party, two cases). As might be expected, environmental policy was predominantly an issue of the left (mentioned in 42.9 per cent of cases) with little interest on the right (12.5 per cent). It was also more of an opposition (27.8 per cent) than a government issue (12.5 per cent) while there was no appreciable difference between mainstream (25 per cent) and marginal parties (28.6 per cent). Immigration had the opposite profile: a concern of the right (37.5 per cent) rather than the left (14.3 per cent), the government (50 per cent) rather than the opposition (16.7 per cent) and the mainstream (50 per cent) rather than the margins (7.1 per cent). Social policy ran somewhat counter to expectations, more likely to be mentioned by the right (50 per cent) than the left (42.9 per cent), by government (50 per cent) than by opposition (44.4 per cent) and especially by mainstream (62.5 per cent) rather than marginal parties (35.7 per cent). The latter can be explained not only by the lack of explicit reference from the KKE but also to three mentions from ND. This reflects the finding by Konstantinidis (2004) that after the fall of its 1991–93 government, associated with neoliberal policies, ND was trying to promote a more socially sensitive image. Finally, justice and crime was an ND monopoly, mentioned by the party on both occasions in which it was in government.

In terms of decision-making level, it was striking that in an era of multilevel governance, not a single Greek party referred to a role for sub-national government, whether alone or in collaboration with another level of governance. In fact, only one party (SYN in 1994) mentioned the potential role of sub-national government as the 'third partner' in Europe, alongside the EU institutions and the national governments. This was despite the fact that five months after the 1994 Euro-election, Greece held its first elections for a new second tier of local government at the prefecture level. Even in 2009, after 15 years of functioning, the prefectures had not impinged on the Greek parties' conceptions of European policy-making. It remains to be seen whether a new territorial restructuring in 2010 replacing the prefectures with 13 regional governments, will influence this picture in the future.

As can be seen from Figure 8.5, across all policy areas, the leading preference, in cases where one was expressed, was for the EU to play a substantive policy role. This suggests support for supranational governance, consistent with our findings under the theme of EU decision-making procedures. Care should be taken, however, in suggesting this necessarily implied an exclusive supranational competence. Parties were not always very explicit about the decision-making procedures they envisaged. It would be hard to imagine, for example, that the nine cases in which parties declared support for an EU foreign and defence policy meant they imagined this completely replacing national policy. In three cases, parties explicitly referred to mixed competences, with parallel national input in the specific policy area. Two of these concerned parties which on other occasions, referred only to an EU role in the specific policy area.<sup>11</sup> This suggests that at least in the Greek case, the 'supranational' and 'mixed' categories should probably both be counted as indicating support for expanding the limits of integration. That an exclusive national preference appeared so seldom was due to the fact that the KKE, whose national policy-making preference is implicit throughout its manifestos, only explicitly referred to this in relation to foreign and security policy. In terms of breakdown among our sub-groups, the supranational preference, mentioned in 50 per cent of total cases for at least one policy area, remained constant at this level both for incumbents and opposition parties and for left- and right-wing cases. Only in the marginal-mainstream pairing




Figure 8.5 Decision-making preferences by policy area in Greek Euro-election manifestos, 1994–2009.



were the former more likely (62.5 per cent) than the latter (42.9 per cent) to support EU policy competence.

Party positions on scope of governance remained consistent diachronically. The only exceptions were the two examples of support for mixed competences which seem unlikely to indicate an actual change of preference. Party preferences also remained stable across different policy areas, suggesting the influential factor was the basic stance towards European integration rather than the specific dynamics of policy-making in a particular field. PASOK, ND, POLAN, SYN and the Ecogreens all supported supranational policy competences in the policy fields they mentioned. The KKE was alone in stating a preference for exclusive national competences in any of our policy areas. Scope of governance was not addressed at all by LAOS, in line with its general downplaying of European issues. Nor does the issue appear in the 2009 SYRIZA manifesto, marking a significant break with the consistent references to three specific policy areas (foreign and defence, social and environmental policies) in the SYN manifestos of 1994–2004. Finally, DIKKI offers a rather interesting case. Despite its opposition to 'Maastricht', DIKKI supported supranational policy competences in some policy areas. It called for an EU defence policy, including protection of its members' external borders, while simultaneously insisting on the national right to autonomous foreign policy action. The party also wanted the EU to be active on the environment. On social policy, DIKKI not only called for European policies on employment creation and social cohesion but also made a surprising – and revolutionary – call for EU action in the areas of health, welfare and pensions.

## Patterns and conclusions

Summing up patterns of competition, governing parties were less likely than the opposition to compete on issues of European integration. This was reflected in the thematic content of their statements on Europe: incumbents hardly referred to identity (no references to national identity, one to European identity), made fewer references than the opposition to scope of governance but were equally likely to discuss representation. With regard to policy areas, government participants were more likely to talk about social policy and immigration and less likely to refer to foreign and defence or environmental policy. In terms of support for integration, they were somewhat less critical than the opposition of the current functioning of EU democracy. Confounding theoretical predictions, however, governing parties were no more likely than the opposition to make statements supporting supranational decision-making or scope of governance.

For mainstream parties, European integration was also less salient than for their marginal opponents. They made far fewer references to identity, whether national or European, but were equally likely to discuss representation or scope of governance. Mainstream parties showed far greater interest in social policy than the marginals while making more references to immigration and less to foreign and defence policy, with no difference between them on the environment.

In terms of support for integration, they were considerably less negative about current EU democracy than the marginal parties. They were also significantly more supportive of supranationalism in both decision-making and scope of governance. In this case, therefore, theoretical expectations were fulfilled with the two parties at the core of the system more integration-supportive than those on the margins.

Given that the group of governing parties is a subset of the mainstream cases, our results indicate that the same parties took a more favourable stance towards European integration when out of power than when in government. As explained above, this outcome was essentially due to the shift in PASOK's competition strategy, entailing a new emphasis on the party's pro-European credentials from the 2004 Euro-election onwards. This finding underlines the solid nature of the pro-integrationist consensus between Greece's two main parties during this period. Neither party when in opposition made the tactical eurosceptic shift suggested by Sitter's theory. Instead, for both PASOK and ND, their support for integration was a strategic choice. They preferred to mobilise support by criticising their rival's handling of European issues rather than by challenging the basic direction of European policy.

Examining our third prediction, concerning ideological orientation, right-wing parties were significantly less likely to compete on European issues than the left. They made more references to national and fewer references to European identity. While equally interested in scope of governance, they showed considerably less interest in issues of representation. Thematically, right-wing parties showed more interest in immigration and social policies and less interest in foreign and defence policy and the environment than the left. With regard to support for integration, parties of the right were considerably less likely to make negative statements about the current democratic functioning of the EU. However, contrary to our expectations, right and left were equally likely to support supranational decision-making and policy-making competences.

In fact, our research showed that during the period under examination, there was considerable support for deeper integration among Greek political parties, including some opposition and marginal parties and those on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Parties supporting integration included some normally regarded as at least soft eurosceptic. As mentioned above, the most detailed strategy for the EU's institutional deepening could be found in some SYN manifestos while DIKKI was apparently prepared to envisage a significant expansion of EU social policy competences into areas currently reserved for the nation-state. This suggests that, contrary to the way in which it is normally envisaged, the basic distinction in the Greek debate was not that between parties supporting or opposing the current direction of integration. Indeed, in the one question measuring attitudes towards the latter, all the Greek parties (except LAOS, which did not mention it) expressed a negative opinion at least once about the functioning of EU democracy.

Rather, what emerges is a fundamental distinction between the parties which were prepared to envisage further European integration and those

which were against. In this regard, only the communists insisted on a return to the nation-state. In its 1994 Euro-election manifesto, the party explained that each state should move ahead on its own, carrying out its own revolution while waiting for the rest of the European countries to follow suit. The two small parties of the right also emphasised the nation-state, which for LAOS should function in the context of a European confederation with relations based on cooperation rather than integration. In contrast, POLAN rather confusingly situated the nation-state in a European federation without providing clear indications of what it had in mind. However, POLAN's ambiguous stance suggested that, in contrast to KKE and LAOS, this party, like the others examined here, was open to the deepening of integration. Thus, in the period after Maastricht and before the crisis, the Greek party consensus in favour of integration extended beyond the system's mainstream core, also embracing all the marginal parties with the exception of the two at the furthest ends of the political spectrum. While the parties had varying views on the direction they wanted Europe to take, all saw Greece's future within a framework of European integration. This confirms the picture of pre-crisis Greece as an overwhelmingly pro-European country before the impact of economic turmoil after 2009.

## Notes

- 1 On the change in PASOK's policy, see Featherstone 1988 ch. 7; Kazakos 1992; Verney 1996; Moschonas 2001. Compared to the interest in PASOK, there is rather a dearth of literature on New Democracy's European policy, especially in English.
- 2 For example, 17 and 19 parties contested the 2004 and 2009 national elections.
- 3 One objection to such literature – that, unlike manifestos, it has not been approved by party congress – is not so relevant in the Greek case, where with the exception of the left-wing KKE and SYN, manifestos are usually not voted by party organs but produced by central office.
- 4 The personal archives were those of Susannah Verney and Eftichia Teperoglu. The authors would particularly like to thank the latter for sharing her material with us.
- 5 A complete list of the documents selected, not included here for reasons of space, is available from the lead author (deplan@otenet.gr).
- 6 On the KKE's European policy, see Dunphy 2004 pp. 103–112.
- 7 On SYN's European policy, see Tsakatika 2009 and Dunphy 2004 pp. 103–112.
- 8 On POLAN and its political strategy, see Ellinas 2010 ch. 5. To date, there has been no study of the party's European policy.
- 9 On LAOS and its strategy, see Ellinas 2010, Psarras 2010; on its European policy: Vasilopoulou 2010 ch. 6.
- 10 A position reminiscent of the description of Greece as simultaneously European, Balkan and Mediterranean used by PASOK in the 1970s to counter ND's slogan of 'Greece belongs to the West'.
- 11 ND on immigration and SYN on social policy.

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